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25X1A REPORT NO.

## INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Korea

DATE DISTR.

20 Sept. 1950

SUBJECT Background of North Korean Invasion

NO. OF PAGES

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
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## THE WING REPORT WAS PREVIOUSLY

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- 1. The Soviet Military Advisory Group, North Korea early in 1950 instructed the NKPA to strengthen and train its forces. The NKPA transferred its ordnance installations from cities to isolated areas, and hid Soviet supplies, weapons and ammunition. At the same time, Soviet intelligence assured the North Korean (NK) government that the U.S. was not preparing for war, but that the USSR planned to occupy the Republic of Korea by September 1950. NK participation would be important in plans for an invasion of Japan by NK and Chinese Communist troops. Later the Communists would use Japan and Korea as USSR bases for a third world war. The Soviets emphasized that the key to victory is ideological, not based on armaments.
- On about 5 April the USSR called up nearly 200,000 troops for training.
   By August these troops were to be concentrated at Khabarovsk, ready to aid North Korea if the situation worsens.
- 3. Two divisions of Chinese Communist troops arrived in Antung on 23 May from unknown bases in China. They were transferred to Sinuiju in early July, and were sent to various NKPA divisions at the front.\*


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Comment. These were probably Korean troops who had been fighting with the Chinese Communist Army in Manchuria.



This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 15 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

Next Rev. Date: 2008